This can best be seen in what they say about truth and validity (see BOX 1) . Formerly We are puzzled by what JKG say about a valid inference, "In everyday reasoning, its premises should also be true in every case in which its conclusion is true." We have no idea where this use of "should" comes from. We do not know of any normative logic in which the premises of a valid inference "should" be true when the conclusion is true. Nor do we know of any experimental result supporting this claim about "everyday reasoning".
In addition to these theoretical problems, the evidence JKG present for how MMT integrates logic and probability is weak. In particular, their Figure 4 , which apparently demonstrates this integration, only shows that adjustable parameters are needed to fit MMT to data. But this is true for almost any cognitive theory. It does not make them probabilistic theories.
Another main plank in JKG's argument is that MMT provides a better account of syllogistic reasoning than the probability heuristic model (PHM) [6] . However, the metaanalysis [7] they report comparing PHM with MMT used accuracy as a measure but did not allow PHM to predict no valid conclusion (NVC) responses. This move contradicts PHM in which NVC responses are predicted by one of its main heuristics (the max-heuristic). When appropriate model comparison methods are used, there is evidence that PHM provides better fits to the data than MMT [8] .
According to JKG, MMT provides a better account of non-monotonicity because they generate explanations of an inconsistency. Such explanations can just as well be represented in causal Bayes nets [9, 10] . But neither theory produces explanations; they only represent them once generated from long term memory for world knowledge.
A further supposed advantage of MMT is that it allows kinematic models that unfold in time. As the representations and processes employed in their example of a kinematic MMT bear absolutely no relationship whatever to the representation/process pair that JKG argue underpins deductive/probabilistic reasoning, this supposed advantage is completely spurious.
In summary, JKG's aim was to clarify the relationship between logic and probability.
They certainly do not do this. Their denial that or-introduction (from p to p v q) is valid in
MMT is critical here as many fundamental theorems of probability depend on this inference.
By contrast, the relation between logic and probability in the New Paradigm, with its probability conditional, could not be closer or more precise (see BOX 1) .
(796) WORDS Box 1: The validity of arguments (199 WORDS + 1 Figure) The New Paradigm defines validity as probabilistic validity (p-validity), where an inference is p-valid precisely if the uncertainty of its conclusion (i.e., one minus the probability of the conclusion) cannot be greater than the sum of the uncertainties of its premises [1] . Probability theory ultimately depends on classical logic, and all classically valid inferences are p-valid. P-validity is also monotonic: adding premises to an inference cannot decrease the total uncertainty of the premises.
JKG fail to distinguish between the logical concept of p-validity and the special use of this term in work on syllogisms [2] , which made additional extra-logical independence Figure   1 instantiates this inference schema and provides a test of which represents the natural language "if." Figure 1 put milk in tea  tea will taste great (put milk in tea & put gasoline in tea)  tea will taste great "That's invalid!" put milk in tea  tea will taste great (put milk in tea & put gasoline in tea)  tea will taste great "That's valid!" Figure 1 : Are people like Ann, interpreting "if" as , or are they rather like Bob, interpreting "if" as ? Ask them to evaluate the argument mentioned in the box and see whether, like Ann, they reject it as invalid or, like Bob, accept it as valid.
FIGURE 1 HERE

